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Abstract
This article presents a general method to solve dynamic models of interactions between multiple
strategic agents that extends the static model studied previously by the authors. It describes a gen-
eral model of several interacting agents, their domination relations as well as a graph encoding their
information pattern. It provides a general resolution algorithm and discusses the dynamics around the
equilibrium.
Our model explains apparent irrational or biased individual behaviors as the result of the actions of
several goal-specic rational agents. Our main example is a three-agent model describing the conscious,
the unconscious, and the body. We show that, when the unconscious strategically dominates, the
equilibrium is unconscious-optimal, but body and conscious-suboptimal. In particular, the unconscious
may drive the conscious towards its goals by blurring physical needs.
Our results allow for a precise account of agentstime rate preference. Myopic behavior among agents
leads to oscillatory dynamics : each agent, reacting sequentially, adjusts its action to undo other agents
previous actions. This describes cyclical and apparently inconsistent or irrational behaviors in the dual
agent. This cyclicality is present when agents are forward-looking, but can be dampened depending on
the conscious sensitivity to other agentsactions.
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Introduction
Irrational actions are usually attributed to an unconscious agent whose actions would, at times, supersede
those of the conscious. Economically, this unconscious activity should be modeled as the action of a single,
permanent and fully rational agent acting alongside the conscious. Yet this obvious path to modeling the
unconscious as an economic agent has systematically been disregarded by the literature, for a single and no
less obvious reason : two rational agents sharing the same information and acting through one individual
should have two perfectly identical actions, boiling down to a single rational action. No irrationality would
emerge from such a setup.
Yet to make sense of the unconsciousactions, one has to suppose it to be rational. Yet one must also
supposed it to be permanent, in the sense that it should not be possible to dismiss it at will. Besides,
unconscious and conscious must have identical information. Consequently, a di¤erence in actions between
these two rational agents can only emerge from di¤erent grids of lecture, i.e. from the way they process
information.
The question therefore is not to know whether we should model the unconscious as a permanent and
rational agent, but to infer how its interpretation of the reality can di¤er from the consciousone.
This approach has been developed in [L], who dubbed the combination of these two - conscious and
unconscious - fully economically rational agents, the dual agent. In this setup, irrational behaviors do not
arise from the existence of an irrational unconscious, but from the mere fact that two agents, "conscious"
and "unconscious", evaluate events through di¤erent grids, though acting through one single body.
True, economic models of inconsistent behaviors have already considered the person as a set of interacting
sub-agents1 . They model dual or multiple selves acting synchronicallyand/or diachronicallyon a similar
set of information to achieve di¤erent objectives2 . To Picoeconomics, in particular, this situation is a
bargaining game between several selves3 . In this framework, the role of the unconscious - inasmuch as such
a notion can be attributed to the sub-structures they consider - usually appears as a mere unknown random
modication on the short-term utility. The authors of the present paper believe, on the contrary, that
patterns of behavior display some persistency and must consequently be active at all stages of the decision
and action processes. They see the human psyche as several agents in complex, simultaneous and possibly
strategic interactions.
The notion of dual agent proposed by [L] must specically be distinguished from the dual selfconsidered
by Fudenberg and Levin [FL]. In their setup, long-run and short-run sub-structures model behaviors of self-
control. The long-run self imposes costs on short-run selves and control their behaviors, so that an agent will
successively identify to several selves, each disappearing in turn. Whereas [FL] and Picoeconomics model
unknown mechanisms inducing changes in the agents utility, our goal is to describe these very processes,
along with the reason of their incoherence and inconsistency. Only by describing some unconscious rational
behavior can we hope to achieve this.
[GL, GLW], two subsequent papers, formalized and generalized the dual agent approach of [L]. They
model individual behavior as a system of interacting rational structures, or rational agents, embedded in a
network of interactions. External signals activate structures that react by sending signals throughout the
network, in turn activating other structures, and so on4 .
[GL] presented a dynamic model where one agent dominates, and showed that such a model can, depend-
ing on its parameters, present stable or unstable oscillations, as well as periodic cycles. More importantly,
the actions of the dominating agent induce apparent change of objective, or switch in preferences in other
agents. This led us to introduce the notion of e¤ective utility, and propose an alternative interpretation of
the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
However, this model did not take into account more complex situations, such as several competing
dominant agents, or tripartite games, where a structure is used to manipulate another one. In a given
individual, conscious objectives regarding the body may encounter unconscious resistance. In social relations,
one group may manipulate an other group against a third one.
[GLW] designed a general pattern of static and strategic interactions among several agents to model
1See [Ross].
2For example cases of procrastination such as Akerlofs [Akerlof].
3 [Ainslie92]. see [Ross] and references therein for an account.
4See [GL] for a precise account.
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such congurations. A graph describing the agentsstrategic relations and their interactions command the
resolution of the model. We used this pattern to solve a three-agents model, respectively a body, a conscious
and an unconscious. These three terms are only generic terms and should be taken as archetype behaviors,
where the unconscious has a strategic advantage over the conscious and the body, and the conscious dominates
the body. We show that, depending on the parameters of the model, the unconscious can twist the conscious
action via the manipulation of the bodys objectives. It may result in an unstable pattern, such as anorexia
or bulimia, the bodys action being used to deter or reinforce, given the unconscious objective, the task of
the conscious agent.
This static one-period model encompasses, as a particular case, the long-run selfand short-run selves
as well as the successive-selvesmodels of Pico-economics [FL]. Successive agentsactions induce a dynamics
allowing to anticipate long-term patterns such as apparently irrational changes of goals or cyclic behavior.
However no precise study of their dynamic interactions was provided.
The present paper lls this gap by generalizing [GLW] setup in a dynamic framework, replacing static
utilities by intertemporal ones. A one-period delay between one agents action and its perception by the
other agents induces the dynamic of the system. As in [GLW], quadratic utilities model agentsinteractions
around an initial perturbed equilibrium. The frame of interactions between agents is described by a graph
whose vertices are the agents and the oriented arrows represent their pairwise relative strategic advantages.
A method of resolution for this general dynamic model with an arbitrary number of agents is presented.
The domination graph gives the order in which each agents optimization is performed. The solutions are
power series in the discount rates, and are obtained recursively by means of usual linear algebra techniques.
Contrary to [GLW], since utilities and actions are forward-looking, each agents pattern of information is
presented. We assume that each agent knows the domination relations between the structures he strategically
dominates in the graph. It also knows the parameters characterizing the agents interactions, but ignores
the inuence of the structures he does not dominate.
This pattern of information is both realistic and general enough to describe the dynamic version of [GLW]:
some plans forecastedby a rst agent, and involving some substructures, may be impaired by the actions
of competing agents, leading to a biased equilibrium from the rst agent perspective. If this rst agent is
misleadingly identied with the individual as a whole, one can conclude to an irrational behavior, through
a bias, or a change of utility function, as already spotted in [GL] for two agents interacting dynamically.
We then use this resolution method to explicitly solve a dynamic version of our basic archetypal three-
agent model. Despite some di¤erences, the long-run equilibrium is similar to the static solution, and the
interpretations of [GLW] are preserved. The dynamic model allows a full interpretation of the stability and
dynamics of the solution : if the unconscious strategically dominates, the equilibrium will be unconscious-
optimal, but both body- and conscious-suboptimal.
Our result allow for a precise account of agentstime rate preference. Myopic behaviors among agents
lead to an oscillatory dynamics. Each agent, reacting sequentially, adjusts its present action to other agents
previous actions to undo their work leading to cyclical and apparently inconsistent or irrational behaviors
in the dual agent.
This cyclicality is present when agents are forward-looking. However, it may be dampened by the
conscioussensitivity to other agentsactions. When it is mild, a stable but conscious-suboptimal equilibrium
may be reached. Otherwise, unstability will appear. A divergent and spiraling behavior reduces the dual
agents welfare.
Inconsistent preferences and apparent switches in behaviors can be ascribed to the unknown action of
some strategic structures behind conscious choices. They describe the nature of the structuresutilities as
well as their interactions, and give a hint about internal sub-structurescapacity to plan their actions.
The paper is organized in four sections. The rst section is a reminder of [GLW] dynamic version of
the three-agent static model. It presents, develops and interprets its results. The second section develops
a general dynamic model of several interacting structures. It provides a resolution method to nd the
equilibrium and the uctuations around it. The third section applies this formalism to section one and gives
a detailed solution of three-agent model. The last section concludes.
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1 A dynamic three-agent model
This section presents a dynamic version of [GLW] the static three agent model. For the sake of clarity, we
will give a detailed reminder of the static model and briey recall its solutions.
[GLW] described the apparent individual irrational behavior as resulting from the combined actions of
three interacting sub-structures - or agents - within the psyche of that individual.
These three interacting agents typically represent two mental processes - "conscious" and "unconscious",
along with a third - physical - process, the body. This setting may alternately apply to every conguration in
which a global instance may be divided into several goal- and information-specic interacting sub-structures.
Suppose an individual whose conscious wants to perform a specic task. However an other independent
agent, his unconscious, has other goals and hence considers this task as suboptimal. Moreover, a third agent,
the body, has specic needs that have to be satised. We assume that the unconscious partly inuences
both the body and the conscious by sending signals, such as discomforts or strains.
Consider a student which experiences di¢ culties in concentrating. Each time he starts studying, he is
suddenly overwhelmed by sleepiness, boredom or compulsions, such as smoking or eating. Being both rested
and fed, these cannot possibly obey objective physical needs.
In our perspective, these bouts of compulsion encapsulate the action of an other, independant agent, the
unconscious, whose priorities and goals di¤er from those of the conscious, mainly because its interpretation
grid di¤ers from the one of the conscious5 . The conscious actions are read and interpreted by the unconscious
according to a specic and completely di¤erent grid. To him, these conscious actions are suboptimal or
potentially dangerous, and he will react accordingly by deterring the conscious actions.
In the case of our student, we can infer that his unconscious perceives learning as being harmful, and
reacts by thwarting the conscious action. Ultimately, the individual visible behavior will merely be the
result of the three agents interactions, which, in a dynamical perspective, may result in some incoherent
patterns, such as an inconsistency in an agents goal.
1.1 Reminder: the static three-agent model
The body, denoted Agent B, or B, is modeled as an automaton whose sole action, n; signals either a physical
need, when n > 0; or a satiety signal, when n < 0.
The conscious, Agent C, or C, can either perform a task w, whose optimum is arbitrarily normalized to
0, or react to Agent Bs signal by satisfying its need with a second action f (feeding). Both actions being
exclusive and complementary, the agents time period will be optimally divided between the two actions,
under the constraint :
w + f = 1
To the unconscious, Agent U, or U, the variable w0s optimum is not zero, but ~w. To reach its goal, the
unconscious will weigh on the consciousoptimization problem by means of three strains6 . Two of them, sw
and sf , directly a¤ect the consciousactions w and f . The third one, sn inuences the body by modifying
its need, n. Neither Agent C nor Agent B are aware of Agent U presence, goals, and actions.
The agent utilities The utilities of the body, unconscious and conscious, are denoted UB, UU, UC respec-
tively and set:
UB =  1
2
(n+ f)
2   nsn (1)
UU =  1
2



f   ~f
2
+  (w   ~w)2 + s2n + s2f + s2w

UC =  1
2

(w   w0)2 + n2

  nw   sf

f   ~f

  sw (w   ~w) :
5See [GL] for more details.
6Actually, this would look like changing the consciousoptimum. See [GL].
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under the constraint: w + f = 1:Utilities are quadratic and normalized so that the terms containing the
square control variables have coe¢ cients of   12 or 0.7
The utility of the body The body, being an automaton, has no specic goals, and its utility function
UB merely describes its reaction to other agentsactions8 . Without any interaction with the unconscious U,
the body would, in rst approximation, react linearly to the conscious C action, "feeding" :
 1
2
(n+ f)
2
The unconscious inuences the body by perturbating its signal
 nsn
Whereas in the absence of the unconscious, the bodys optimum would be reached for
n =  f = 0
This result being suboptimal for Agent U, he will tilt the equilibrium toward its own goal ~f .
Recall that the task performed by the conscious w is not physically demanding, and has no impact on
the bodys response n. Indeed, we do not model physical e¤orts per se, but rather seek to understand how
the unconscious can manipulate an existing equilibrium between the body and the conscious, i.e. the use of
body signals by the unconscious to reach its own goals. By convention  is positive, so that a positive strain
will respond to a positive feeding.
The utility of the conscious In the absence of both the unconscious and the body, the conscious
utility would be :
 1
2
(w   w0)2
so that in the absence of any constraint set on w, Agent C would optimally choose w = w0 > 0.
Body needs a¤ect Agent C through
 1
2
n2   nw
so that the higher is the need, the more painful is the task.
In the absence of Agent U, Agent C sets w = 0 by adjusting the feeding to the anticipated need. The
need is in itself painful since:
 1
2
n2
so we set
 > 0
The above assumption is a direct consequence of dismissing any cost to the feeding f . Here we depart from
standard models where costs, or constraints, are imposed to an agents tasks.Without Agent U, Agent B and
7Note that, in order to use later dynamic models standard notations, we modied some of the notations of [GLW].
8 In this setting, endowing the body with specic goals would have allowed it to manipulate the conscious, which was not
our purpose here.
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f could be discarded from Agent Cs equilibrium. Once Agent U is included in the system, it indirectly
manipulates Agent C through Agent B by assigning a strategic role to f . However we impose a binding
constraint on the feeding by considering f and w as complementary activities within a given time span, and
set f+w = 1, as previously mentioned. The unconscious imposes its goals ~f and ~w on the conscious through
perturbation terms:
 sf (f   ~f)  sw (w   ~w)
driving Agent Cs actions away from 0 and towards ~f and ~w.
Some additional technical conditions on UC will prove convenient. We will ensure that UC is negative
denite and has an optimum by setting :
   2 > 0
Furthermore, excessive working combined with unsatised needs should induce a loss in Agent C utility.
This is implemented by imposing:
 > 0 for n > 0 and w > 0
.
The utility of the unconscious Agents, conscious or unconscious, build their interpretation of a
situation - and thus its utility function - through an own, specic, grid of lecture9 .
Agent U and Agent C will therefore have two completely di¤erent interpretations of a single situation. And
while Agent C will consider f and w as optimal, Agent U will consider other levels of the consciousactivity,
~f , ~w as optimal.
Agent Us goals with respect to Agent Cs activity are:
 1
2
(f   ~f)2   1
2
(w   ~w)2
To insure that UU can have an optimum, we further impose  and  to be positive.
Since the three agents are sub-structures of one single individual, a strain inicted by one agent ends up
being painful for all. The costs incurred are :
 1
2
 
s2n + s
2
f + s
2
w

Additional constraints To have a realistic model, some additional constraints on the coe¢ cients and
variables are required.
Since Agent U inicts a pain if his goals are not reached, sf et sw should be assumed positive. How-
ever such a condition does not exist for sn. Agent U has no optimum value for n. For the unconscious, sn
is a mere adjustment variable, and can be alternately a pain or a reward to the body.
To model the pain imposed by the unconscious over the conscious, the terms  sf (f   ~f) and  sw (w   ~w)
should be negative. The equilibrium values of f and w will respectively lie between 0 and ~f and between 0
and ~w. We therefore impose ~f and  (respectively ~w and ) to have opposite signs.
The hierarchy of strategical advantages. In our setting, some agents are assumed to have a strategical
advantage over others.
Agent U has a strategic advantage over both Agent C and Agent B. It is strategically dominant. Agent C
is strategic only with respect to Agent B, and Agent B has no strategic advantage. The dynamic model will
9See [GL] for further details.
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be solved in the order of this hierarchy of strategical advantages 10 .
We rst implement the time binding constraint w + f = 1 for Agent Cs actions and replace directly
f = 1  w in the utility functions:
UB =  1
2
(n+ 1  w)2 nsn
UU =  1
2
(1  w   ~f)2 1
2
(w   ~w)2 1
2
s2n 
1
2
s2n 
1
2
s2w
UC =  1
2
(w   w0)2   1
2
n2   nw   sf (1  w   ~f)  sw(w   ~w)
Recall that Agent U inuences Agent C in two competing ways. Directly, through the strains sf and sw,
and indirectly, by triggering a need in Agent B through sn. The relative strengths of the parameters will
determine Agent Us preferred channel of action, and lead to di¤erent behaviors in the individual.
Hidden and patent manipulation Two types of unconscious manipulation emerge.
In the rst, the unconscious does not mask its action. The individual is driven away from w0s conscious
optimum, and physical needs n may consequently be under or over-satised, depending on the unconscious
optimum. However, the individual will be aware of this disequilibrium. If physical needs are under-satised,
the situation may not be sustainable in the long run. It will be less so if they are over-satised.
In the second type of manipulation, the individual is driven away from the conscious optimum w, but the
unconscious can manipulate physical needs to mask the disequilibrium. The unconscious may, for instance,
sustain phase of hyperactivity by reducing physical needs, so that the individual will not be conscious of the
disequilibrium. This situation may be more sustainable, but may lead to a breakdown in the longer run.
1.2 Dynamic model
Summing weighted expectations of future utilities transforms the above static utilities into intertemporal
ones, and turn this static model into a dynamic one. However, delays between consecutive actions will induce
some adaptations and, more importantly, the information setup needs to be precisely described.
1.2.1 Presentation of the three-agent model.
Given its own information set, each agent optimizes a forward-looking intertemporal utility function of the
form:
(Vit) =
X
m0
mi EiUi(t+m)
where the discount factor i is Agent i rate of preference for the present, and Ei its expectation operator at
time t. Agent i forecasts of future quantities will be computed given its information set.
The information setup follows the order of domination among agents11 . Agent B, the less informed of
all agents, is only aware of the strains hes a¤ected by. Agent C is aware of its own inuence on Agent
B, and of the strains Agent U puts on him. Agent U , the most informed of all agents, knows the utilities
function of both Agent C and Agent B.
The instantaneous utility Ui(t + m) at time t + m reproduces the static utility of section 1, but introduces
a time dependency in each action variable. We moreover assume that each action taken at time t by any
10For a complete resolution of the model and the discussion of its solutions, see [GLW].
11For the sake of clarity we do not present here the information set up. It will be fully described in the resolution of the
general model.
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agent will only be perceived by the other agents at time t+ 1.
Taking into account all of the above, utilities take the following dynamic form:
UB (t) =  1
2
(n (t) + 1  w (t  1))2   n (t) sn (t  1) (2)
UU (t) =  1
2


1  w (t  1)  ef2   1
2
 (w (t  1)  ew)2   1
2
s2n (t) 
1
2
s2f (t) 
1
2
s2w (t)
UC (t) =  1
2
(w (t)  w0)2   1
2
n2 (t  1)  vn (t  1)w (t)  sf (t  1)

1  w (t)  ef  sw (t  1)  w (t)  et
Note that in each of the above utilities, the agent own action variables appear with a time index t, as expected
for utility at time t, whereas other agentsaction variables appear with a time index t  1.
The full resolution of the dynamical model being presented in the general resolution method, we postpone
the description of the information setup and directly present the results of the dynamic three-agent model.
1.2.2 Solution of the dynamic model
Assuming that the discount rates i are identical and equal to a given , we obtain the following result.
The long-run equilibrium is given by the action variables values :
n = 2

K   w0
 + 1
   
2 + 2K
 + 1
  ( ~w   w0) +  1   ~f + w0

w = 2

K   w0
 + 1
+ 
22   2K
 + 1
  ( ~w   w0) +  1   ~f + w0

+ w0
sn = 
3
 ( ~w   w0) + 

1 

~f + w0


sw =  2 (1 )
 ( ~w   w0) + 

1 

~f + w0


sf = 
2 (1 )
 ( ~w   w0) + 

1 

~f + w0


where we set:
 =    2; K = 2 + 2; and  = + :
The results are very similar to the static case12 . Here again, two di¤erent general patterns appear for the
equilibrium. Agent U can drive Agent C toward its own objectives by implementing a stress on the need of
Agent B.
However, the reaction of Agent B is ambiguous, and depends on the relative strength of the parameters.
Two di¤erent regimes appear in the dynamic setting.
Under the condition :
K >
w0 + 
2
1  2
both w and n are positively correlated to Agent Us goal.
To explain this, recall that Agent U has two channels of actions on Agent C.
12See [GLW] for comparison.
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The direct channel acts through the strains sf and sw. Its e¢ ciency on Agent Cs utility is measured by
the coe¢ cients  and  and thus by
K = 2 + 2
The indirect channel inuences the needs of Agent B, that will in turn impact Agent Cs action. Its strength
 measures the sensitivity of Agent Bs to the strain sn
The above inequality therefore compares the relative strengths of the direct versus the indirect channel.
If the direct channel is more e¢ cient, it is optimal for U to drive Agent Cs activity by acting on the direct
strains sw and sf . Higher feeding will satisfy the higher needs induced by a higher activity for Agent C.
On the other hand, under the condition :
K <
w0 + 
2
1  2
the indirect channel is relatively more e¢ cient than the direct one. Agent U will impose a strain on Agent
B, inducing a decrease of Agent Bs needs, and indirectly allowing Agent C to increase its task. This will be
achieved at a comparatively lower feeding cost than the direct channel. As a result, the equilibrium values
w and n will respectively be positively and negatively correlated to Agent Us goal.
The di¤erence in patterns of behavior appears clearly in the feeding of the individual. Alongside a normal
pattern, where higher feeding is associated with increased work, we nd an anorexicpattern, where reduced
feeding is associated with increased activity.
Fluctuations around the equilibrium. The dynamics and stability of the system may be fully under-
stood by computing the uctuations around the equilibrium. The utility functions being quadratic, these
uctuations are given by a linear rst order dynamic system of the kind
[Y (t)] = M [Y (t  1)] +
h
W^ (t)
i
(3)
where [Y (t)] is the - ve dimensions13 - vector of action variable uctuations around their equilibrium.
[Y (t)] =
0BBBB@
n(t)  n
w(t)  w
sn(t)  sn
sw(t)  st
sf (t)  sf
1CCCCA
The coe¢ cients of the matrix M depend on the parameters of the model and
h
W^ (t)
i
is a - ve components
- vector of random perturbation at time t14 .
The e¤ects of an initial shock on the system are computed using Equation (3). Assume a system in
equilibrium with [Y (0)] = 0 at time t = 0, and consider a single initial shock
h
W^ (t)
i
such that W^ (0) 6= 0
and W^ (t) = 0 for t > 0. Given these assumptions, the solution of Equation (3) is :
[Y (m)] = MmW^ (0)
13The number of action variables.
14The explicit forms are given in Section 3.
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Stability of the system The stability of the system depends on the nature of the matrix M eigenvalues.
Section 3 will show that 0 is a triple eigenvalue, and that the two other eigenvalues are the complex conjugates:
 = i
p


1  1
2
2 (K + ) +
1
2
3
  22 + 2K+O(4) (4)
at the third order approximation in .
 being imaginary, the system is oscillating. This is a direct consequence of our model, where non collab-
orating agents alternately try to stir the equilibrium towards their respective goals by detering other agents
actions.
The system is stable if the modulus jj of  is lower than 1, stably cyclical if it is equal to 1, and
unstable if jj>1.
Let us consider, as a benchmark case, the eigenvalues for  = 0, where all agents only care about the
present. The eigenvalues are ip, and the dynamic is diverging if  > 1, cyclic if  = 1, and converging if
 < 1.
We can interpret these results in the following way. Agent B reacting to Agent Cs feeding in a 1 to 1
ratio, and Agent Cs w reacting to Agent Bs need with a ratio , both agentsactions will be multiplied
by  over a two-period horizon. Agent Us action paying only over a two to three-periods horizon, it is
irrelevant when  = 0, and prevents Agent U from taking it. Myopic behavior among agents leads to an
oscillatory dynamics. Each agent, reacting sequentially, adjusts its action to undo other agentsprevious
actions, describing cyclical and apparently inconsistent or irrational behaviors in the dual agent. These os-
cillations may diverge or fade away with time, depending on the value of .
When  is di¤erent from 0 but relatively small, the system is still oscillatory. However the time concern
 will have an ambiguous e¤ect on its stability. Decomposing Equation (4) in its second and third order
contributions will illustrate this point.
Because of the delay in the actionsimpact, the feedback on the originating agent will be seen in two periods
- under the direct channel - or possibly three periods, under the indirect channel15 .
At the second order in , Equation (4) shows that the agents concern about the future has a stabiliz-
ing e¤ect and reduces the magnitude of the oscillations. At this order, the eigenvaluesmodule is
jj =
p

1  122 (K + )
+O(3)
which is lower than
p
.
The stabilization e¤ect appears at the two-period horizon16 , since Agent U cannot use the indirect channel
in time scale. The stabilization is obtained by Agent Us direct action on Agent C, and by Agent Cs direct
action on Agent B.
At the three-period horizon (the third order in ), the stability is more ambiguous. Agent U can use the
indirect channel to stabilize the system around an equilibrium to its own advantage. On the other hand,
Agent C can react to Agent Us action, by destabilizing Agent Us optimum. Because of theses antinomic
actions, the stability of the system depends on the parametersrelative strength.
Neglecting higer order contributions, an overall interpretation of the system can be reached by combining
these two di¤erent horizon e¤ects. The time concern total correction to the eigenvalues is :
 1
2
2 (K + ) +
1
2
3
  22 + 2K
15 i.e. from Agent U to Agent B, then from Agent B to Agent C and ultimately from Agent C to Agent U.
16 the second-order in 
10
Recall that  measures the overall concern of the unconscious for the conscious activity, K the sensitivity
of the conscious agent to the strains imposed by the unconscious, and  the relative strength of the direct
e¤ect of the need on the conscious agent compared to its e¤ect via the e¤ort term  nw of UC in equations
1.
The above quantity is positive if
K (2   1)  22 > 0
and
 >

K (2   1)  22  threshold
Since  > 0, if  and K are large enough, i.e. if they are such that :
2   1 > 0
and
K (2   1)  22 > 0
there exists a threshhold threshold such that when  > threshold ; the instability of the system is increased
by the forward-looking nature of its agents, and its stability reinforced otherwise. As a result, given a
time rate preference , if the conscious is highly sensitive to the other agentsactions, and if conscious and
unconscious goals are strongly divergent, an instability in the system may arise. The system is driven away
from its equilibrium, leading to an explosive and suboptimal pattern for all agents.
Moreover, the higher the time concern , the lower the sensitivity  can be to make the unstability case
arise. In other words, the more the system is forward looking, the more can we expect some unstability.
These results provide a pattern of the nature of structuresutilities as well as their interactions, and give
a hint about internal sub-structurescapacity to plan their actions. Inconsistent preferences and apparent
switches in behaviors can be ascribed to the unknown action of some strategic structures behind conscious
choices. The systems cyclicality, the striking di¤erences emerging between dynamic patterns of behaviors of
forward and non-forward looking structures, may, through empirical observations, support forward-looking
decisions in hidden partial processes, and give a better understanding of the sequence of mental processes.
2 A general model of several interacting structures
Let us now present and solve the general dynamic model of several interacting structures that encompasses
the three-agents example presented above. We will rst briey recall the general static formalism of [GLW],
on which the dynamic version will be developed.
2.1 Static several interacting agents.
This static version introduces the various agentsutility functions and the domination graph that commands
the resolution algorithm.
Strategic relations between agents The agentsstrategic relations dene the model setup. An oriented
graph   whose vertices are labelled by the agents involved describe these relations.
When Agent i has a strategic advantage over Agent j; we draw an oriented edge from i to j and write i! j.
If there exists an oriented path from i to j, we write the relation i j, and state that Agent i dominates
directly or indirectly Agent j or, equivalently, that Agent j is subordinated to Agent i. If there is no oriented
path from i to j, we write j 6 i; where it is always understood that i 6= j. In the following, we merely
consider connected graphs without loops.
Under these conventions, the situation is modeled by an oriented graph whith vertices labelled after B;C;
and U , and whose edges orientation summarize the agentsstrategic advantages
C ! B; U ! B; U ! C
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Matricial formalism Agentsutilities are described by the following matricial formalism. Agentsactions
are encompassed in a vector of actions, or control variables. The number of possible actions determine the
size of the vector. Utilities being quadratic, matrices may be associated with them.
Let Xi 2 Rni be Agent is vector of control variables, and ~X(i)j 2 Rni the vector of goals associated
with the variables Xj ; as expected by agent i. We normalize ~X
(i)
j to 0, so that Agent i wishes to achieve
Xi = 0 and Xj = ~X
(i)
j .
Agent i0s utility is given by:
Ui =  1
2
tXiA
(i)
ii Xi  
1
2
X
ji
t

Xj   ~X(i)j

A
(i)
jj

Xj   ~X(i)j

 
X
ji
tXiA
(i)
ij Xj  
X
j 6i
t

Xi   ~X(j)i

A
(i)
ij Xj   tXiPi
In the absence of any interaction, Agent i0s utility is given by the term
 1
2
tXiA
(i)
ii Xi
The variables Xi are normalized so that A
(i)
ii is a fi  ni diagonal matrix whose coe¢ cients are 1 or 0.
If Agent i0s subordinate agents actions Xj depart from ~X
(i)
j , Agent i
0s will experience a loss of utility
of the form : X
ji
t

Xj   ~X(i)j

A
(i)
jj

Xj   ~X(i)j

The fj  nj matrix A(i)jj of parameters is of course symmetric.
The impact of Agent j0s action on Agent is utility isX
ji
tXiA
(i)
ij Xj  
X
j 6i
t

Xi   ~X(j)i

A
(i)
ij Xj
where j  i can be seen as the impact of Agent j0s action on Agent i. In our model, Agent j does not
know the agents to whom he is subordinated, and processes their signals as external ones. The second term
models the strain imposed on Agent i by Agent j to achieve its own objectives for Xi.
Remark 1 Since the linear term in Xj disappears during the resolution,X
j 6i
tXiA
(i)
ij Xj
is equivalent to X
j 6i
t

Xi   ~X(j)i

A
(i)
ij Xj
Notation 2 By convention, for the ni  nj parameters matrices A(i)ij , we will write tA(i)ij = A(i)ji .
The last term tXiPi models the change in utility caused by external perturbations summarized by the
vector Pi 2 Rni . For instance, the utilities of our three-agent model can be rewritten in the matricial
formalism as:
UB =  1
2
tXBXB   tXBA(B)BUXU   tXBA(B)BCXC  
1
2
tXCA
(B)
CCXC + (
tXC   tXB)EB
UU =  1
2
tXUA
(U)
UUXU  
1
2
t

XC   ~X(U)C

A
(U)
CC

XC   ~X(U)C

UC =  1
2
tXCA
(C)
CCXC  
1
2
t

XB   ~X(C)B

A
(C)
BB

XB   ~X(C)B

  tXCA(C)CBXB   tXUA(C)UCXC   tXU A(C)UC XC
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where the control variables for the agents are concatenated in the following vectors:
XB =
 
n

; XU =
0@snst
sf
1A ; XC =  w   w0 :
where the left upper-script t(  ) denotes the usual transposition of matrices. The goals of Agent U are
condensed in the vector :
~X
(U)
C =

( ~w w0)+(1 ( ~f+w0))
+

and those of Agent C are described by:
~X
(C)
B =
  w0


All others goals are normalized to 0 . We also set :
XC =
   ( ~w   w0)
1 

~f + w0
!
The utilities quadratic relations are commanded by the parameters matrices :
A
(B)
BU =
 
 0 0

; A
(B)
BC =
  1 ; A(U)CC = ()
A
(C)
CC =
 
1

; A
(C)
BB =
 


; A
(C)
CB =
 


A
(B)
CC = (1) ; EB =
 
1

;
A
(U)
UU =
0@1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
1A ; A(C)UC =
0@ 0
 
1A ; A(C)UC =
0@0 0 0
0 
1A
By convention, we set A(i)ji =
t

A
(i)
ij

.
Moreover, since Agent B is dominated by both Agent C and Agent U, and Agent C is dominated by Agent
U, the following matricial utilities will lead to the same equilibrium as UB; UU; UC.
U 0B =  
1
2
tXBXB   tXBA(B)BUXU   tXBA(B)BCXC  
1
2
tXCA
(B)
CCXC  tXBEB
U 0U =  
1
2
tXUA
(U)
UUXU  
1
2
t

XC   ~X(U)C

A
(U)
CC

XC   ~X(U)C

U 0C =  
1
2
tXCA
(C)
CCXC  
1
2
t

XB   ~X(C)B

A
(C)
BB

XB   ~X(C)B

  tXCA(C)CBXB   tXUA(C)UCXC
2.2 Presentation of the dynamic version
This section describes the general model for dynamics interacting structures.The procedure is identical to
that described in the three-agents case17 . We adapt the matricial static utilities to a dynamic context, and
assume that each agent optimizes a forward-looking intertemporal utility function, given its own information
set.
The intertemporal utility is of the form :
Vi(t) =
X
m0
mi EiUi (t+m)
17See Section 1.2.1
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where i is Agent i
0s discount factor, and Ei his conditional expectation at time t. We give the information
pattern allowing an agent to compute its own expectations. Ui (t+m) is period t+m utility.
Ui (t+m) =  1
2
Xti (t+m)A
(i)
ii Xi (t+m) (5)
 1
2
X
ji
Xtj (t+m  1)A(i)jj Xj (t+m  1)
 
X
ji
Xti (t+m)A
(i)
ij Xj (t+m  1)
 Xti (t+m)Pi (t+m)
+
X
ji
Xtj (t+m  1)A(i)jj ~X(i)j
 
X
j 6i

Xti (t+m)  ~X(j)i

A
(i)
ij Xj (t+m  1)
This utility function is,up to some constant irrelevant term, a straightforward generalization of the particular
three-agents model18 . Recall that external and other agentssignals are perceived by Agent i with a one
period delay19 .
2.3 Resolution of the dynamic model
The resolution proceeds in the reverse order of the domination graph, starting from the bottom of the graph
with the optimization for the less strategic agents, and proceeding to the top of the graph.
2.3.1 Optimization problem and form of the solution
At time t; the optimization problem for Agent i is :
@
@Xi(t)
Vi(t) = 0
For every Agent j such that i  j, the optimization has already been performed, so that, Xj (t+m) for
m  1 are functions of Xi(t). We thus obtain :
A
(i)
ii Xi(t) + Ei
X
m1
0@X
ji
mi

Aiij
@Xj (t+m  1)
@Xi(t)
t1AXi (t+m)
+Ei
X
ji
0@A(i)ij Xj (t  1) + X
m1
mi

@Xj (t+m  1)
@Xi(t)
t
A
(i)
jj Xj (t+m  1)
1A
+
X
j 6i
A
(i)
ij Xj(t  1) (6)
= "i(t)
where
"i(t) =  Pi(t) + Ei
X
ji
X
m1
mi

@Xj (t+m  1)
@Xi(t)
t
A
(i)
jj
~X
(i)
j
Each agent optimizes an intertemporal utility function that only depends on present and future variables.
18See Equations 2 and explanations below.
19 In (5) we have developed the quadratic terms, to isolate the terms linear in ~X(i)j .
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The model is thus forward looking. Each structure reacts to its own forecasts of future variables. These
forecasts are built from the signals Xj(t  1); the information set, where j runs over the set of agents. The
solution of the model is found by identication. Utilities being quadratic, the linear solution is of the form:
Xi(t) = Mi [X(t  1)] +Wi(t)
where [X(t)] is a one-column concatenation of the vectors Xi(t) in an arbitrary chosen order. The coe¢ cients
of matrix Mi depend on the parameters of the model, and must be identied by way of the optimization
equations. The size of Mi is determined by the dimensions of Xi(t) and [X (t  1)]. The constant vectors
Wi(t) depend on the perturbation parameters Pi(t) and the objectives ~X
(i)
j .
For later purpose we need a concatenated form of the previous set of equations :
[X(t)] = M [X(t  1)] + [W (t)] (7)
Its iteration describes the dependency between the variables at time t and t+m:
[X (t+m)] = Mm [X(t)] +
mX
k=1
Mm k [W (t+ k)] (8)
where [W (t)] is the concatenation of theWi(t), and the square matrixM is the concatenation of the matrices
Mi.
We use the postulated solution (8) to compute @Xj(t+m)@Xi(t) for i j in the optimization problem for Agent i.
This yields:
@Xj (t+m)
@Xi(t)
= (Mm)ji (9)
where (Mm)ji is the block ji in the m the power of the concatenated matrix M .
Inserting (9) in (6) we rewrite the optimization problem at time t for the agent i:
A
(i)
ii Xi(t) + Ei
X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij
 
Mm 1

ji
1AXi (t+m)
+Ei
X
ji
0@A(i)ij Xj (t  1) + X
m1
mi
t
 
Mm 1

ji
A
(i)
jj Xj (t+m  1)
1A
+
X
j 6i
A
(i)
ij Xj(t  1)
= "i(t)
which can be rewritten in a more compact form :
A
(i)
ii Xi(t) =  Ei
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij
 
Mm 1

ji
1AXi (t+m)
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t
 
Mm 1

ji
A
(i)
jj Xj (t+m  1)
1A9=;
 
X
j
A
(i)
ij Xj (t  1) + "i(t) (10)
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2.3.2 Pattern of information
The full resolution of the model relies on the expectations EiMm 1 which itself relies on each agents infor-
mation set, i.e. its knowledge of other agents parameters.
We propose a pattern of information over the domination graph, which describes the way an agent performs
its forecasts.
Each agent knows the domination relations of the subtree he strategically dominates, but ignores the reac-
tivity of the subtrees agents to external, non dominated agents. In other words, Agent i knows the values
of the A(k)k` for i k and i `. The remaining coe¢ cients A
(k)
k` are forecasted to 0 for this agent. Remark
that, as a consequence of our assumptions, agents do not attribute a probability to the coe¢ cients they
forecast, but rather a xed value.
Moreover, we assume that, at each period t, Agent i knows the signals Xj(t   1) for i  j and for the
Xj(t  1) j 6 i by which he is a¤ected.
From our hypotheses we can infer some results about the agentsforecasts.
First, Agent i forecasts to 0 the actions of all agents he does not dominate. That is for j 6 i and m  0:
EiXj (t+m) = 0
Consider the optimization equation (10) of Agent j, and compute its expectation by Agent i. Agents i
forecasts of all coe¢ cients in the equation equal 0 which implies EiXj(t) = 0.
In the same way,
EiXj (t+m) = 0 for m  0:
Using Equation (7) the last relation can be translated in an expectation formula about matrix M :
EiMj = 0 for j 6 i
Moreover, Agent i knowing its own parameters, and its own reaction to perceived signals, one set :
EiMi = Mi
More precise forecasts of the remaining blocks of matrix M will be needed. We set:
(EiM)`;j = 0 for j 6 i and any `
(EiM)`;j = (M)`;j for i j and i `
Having dened the forecasts of the matrix M of parameters by the various agents, we have to complete the
information scheme by xing the forecasts of the random perturbations as well as the goals vectors.
Future shocks are unknown, and random shocks Pi are assumed to be :
EiPj (t+m) = 0 for m  1 and EiPj(t) = 0 for i 6= j and EiPi(t) = Pi(t)
At time t, agent i is only aware of the shock he is a¤ected by, Pi(t).
Agent i is aware of the goals of the agents he is strategically dominating, so that :
Ei ~X
(i)
j =
~X
(i)
j for j  i
and
Ei ~X
(j)
k =
~X
(j)
k for k j  i:
Given this scheme of forecasts and the dynamical equation (8) , we can infer for m  0 that, for i j :
Ei [Xj (t+m)] = Ei

(M)
m+1

j
[X(t  1)]

=

(EiM)
m+1

j
Ei [X(t  1)] ,
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and for j = i :
Ei [Xi (t+m)] =

(EiM)
m+1

i
Ei [X(t  1)]
The information setup and the agentsparameters forecasts being detailed, we can turn to the resolution
of the optimization equations. This is done in the most general way, in the form of an algorithm.
2.3.3 The resolution algorithm
The postulated form of the dynamic (Equation (8)) is:
[X (t+m)] = Mm [X(t)] +
mX
k=1
Mm k [W (t+ k)]
or under the form of its i block line :
Xi (t+m) =
X
j2 
 
(Mm)ij Xj(t) +
mX
k=1
 
Mm k

ij
Wj (t+ k)
!
To identify the matrix M and the vectors W (t+ k), this relation is inserted in Equation (10) for each i.20
Since we have a set of equation, one for each agent, the resolution follows the order of the graph. We proceed
upstream, solving for the less to the most strategical agent.
Rewriting Equation (10) for Agent i, and using the relation
Ei (M
m) = (Ei (M))
m
yields
A
(i)
ii Xi(t) =  
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1AEiXi (t+m)
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj EiXj (t+m  1)
1A9=;
 
X
j
A
(i)
ij Xj(t  1) + "i(t):
Implement the a priori form of the solution :
[X (t+m)] = Mm [X(t)] +
mX
k=1
Mm k [W (t+ k)] for m  0
The variables Xi(t   1) and Wi(t) being independent, the expectation pattern21 leads to two systems of
equations dening both Mi and Wi(t).
A
(i)
ii Mi [X(t  1)] =  
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A(EiM)m+1
i
[X(t  1)]
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj ((EiM)
m
)j [X(t  1)]
1A9=; (11)
 
X
j
A
(i)
ij Xj(t  1)
20The expectations in (10) are computed with the rules given in Section 2.3.2.
21See Section 2.3.2.
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A
(i)
ii Wi(t) =  
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1Am+1X
k=1

(EiM)
m+1 k

i
Ei [W (t  1 + k)]
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj
mX
k=1

(EiM)
m k

j
Ei [W (t  1 + k)]
1A9=;
+"i(t): (12)
Since

(EiM)
m 1

ji
is the (ji) block of the concatenated matrix (EiM)
m 1, and M appears in both
Equations (11) and (12), we will rst solve Equation (11) to nd M , then solve Equation (12).
Equation (11) can be written equivalently8<:A(i)ii Mi + X
m1
mi
X
ji
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji

A
(i)
ji

(EiM)
m+1

i
+A
(i)
jj ((EiM)
m
)j
9=; [X (t  1)]
=  
X
j 6=i
A
(i)
ij Xj (t  1)
which leads to the dening relation for Mi:
A
(i)
ii Mi +
X
m1
mi
X
ji
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji

A
(i)
ji

(EiM)
m+1

i
+A
(i)
jj ((EiM)
m
)j

=  
h
A
(i)
i
i
(13)
where
h
A
(i)
i
i
is the concatenation in line of the matrices A(i)ij with 0 in the i-th place.
Since one can always rescale the action variables Xi(t 1) so that the matrix A(i)ii is diagonal with eigenvalues
1;we will, starting from here and without any lack of generality, normalize the A(i)ii to be equal to 1. A null
eigenvalue would correspond, in this case, to a redundant action variable, since it could be expressed as a
function of others. It is therefore excluded.
Equation (13) cannot be solved analytically in a general way. However, it can be solved recursively as series
of i. To do so, write the matrix Mi as a power series of i, that is
Mi =
X
m0
mi M
(m)
i
Inserting this expression in Equation (13) leads directly to the recursive system for the matrices M (m)i :
M
(0)
i =  
h
A
(i)
i
i
M
(k)
i =  
X
ji
kX
m=1

t

(EiM)
m 1

ji

A
(i)
ji

(EiM)
m+1

i
+A
(i)
jj ((EiM)
m
)j

k m
where the bracket [A]k m denoting the k  m-th term in the power expansion in i of any quantity A.
This can be computed for every model given any information pattern. The parameter i being lower than 1,
the matrices M (m)i represent some corrections to the case i = 0; when agents have no interest in the future.
To get an insight of the relevant dynamical mechanisms at stake, it will be su¢ cient to cut the series in i
at some xed order.
Equation (11) being solved for EiM , we turn to Equation (12) to nd the perturbation vector [W (t)].
Recall that we set
"i(t) =  Pi(t) + Ei
X
ji
X
m1
mi
t
 
Mm 1

ji
A
(i)
jj
~X
(i)
j :
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Given the form of the expectations22 , we infer EiPj (t+m) = 0, so that the vector Wi(t) in Equation (12)
depends only on the random perturbation Pi(t) and the constants ~X
(i)
j for j  i. Moreover, since (12) is
linear, its solution is of the form :
Wi(t) =  

A
(i)
ii
 1 
P^i(t) + X^i

(14)
where P^i(t) is proportional to Pi(t), and X^i is a linear function of the ~X
(i)
j with j  k to be identied.
Since we assume the information pattern :
Ei ~X
(i)
j =
~X
(i)
j for j  i:
we have also
EiX^j = X^j for j  i and j = i
.
and
EiWj (t+m) =  

A
(j)
jj
 1
X^j for j  i and j = i for m  0
and nally
Ei [W (t+m)] =
h
W^ (i) (t+m)
i
for m  0
where
h
W^ (i) (t+m)
i
denotes the concatenated vector whose components are:
W^
(i)
i (t) = Wi(t)
and
W^
(i)
j (t+m) =  

A
(j)
jj
 1
X^j
for j  i and 0 otherwise.
Replacing Equation (14) in Equation (12) leads to the following expressions for X^i and P^i(t) :
X^i =
X
`i
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1Am+1X
k=1

(EiM)
m+1 k

i`
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj
mX
k=1

(EiM)
m k

j`
1A9=;A(l)``  1 EiX^`
 
X
ji
X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj Ei
~X
(i)
j (15)
22See Section 2.3.2.
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and
P^i(t) =
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A ((EiM)m)ii
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A9=;A(i)ii  1 P^i(t)
+Pi(t): (16)
The rst equation is a recursive relation which can only be solved in the inverse order of domination of the
graph. The vectors X^i are determined by the vectors EiX^j for j  i. Once the X^j for j  i are computed,
the expectations EiX^j can be calculated, and ultimately the vectors X^i are obtained.
The second equation yields directly P^i(t) as a function of Pi(t). One gets
P^i(t) = (1  Ci) 1 Pi(t)
where the matrix Ci is given by
Ci =
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A ((EiM)m)ii
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A9=;A(i)ii  1 :
which ends the resolution method of the general case. More explicit formulas are impossible at this level of
generality23 . Nevertheless, we provide a short account of the equilibrium and the uctuation around it.
2.3.4 Equilibrium and dynamics around the equilibrium
Let us now briey present the long run equilibrium of the system. Starting from the dynamic equation :
Xi(t) = Mi [X(t  1)] +Wi(t):
Agent i long run equilibrium Xi can be dened by equating Xi(t) = Xi(t 1) = Xi for each i; and canceling
all random perturbations Pi(t). Concatenating all Xi in the system long run equilibrium

X

, we get
X

= M

X

+

W

likewise,

W

is the vector [W ] where all external perturbations Pi(t) have been set to 0 :
X

= (1 M) 1  W  = X
m0
Mm

W

:
This last expression only exists if 1 M is invertible. Otherwise multiple equilibria or no equilibrium could
arise, a possibility that is neither the generic case, nor has any practical interest here24 .
To describe the uctuation around

X

, recall that the vectors [W (t)] has Wi(t) =  

A
(i)
ii
 1 
P^i(t) + X^i

for components. Given the dynamic equation :
[X(t)] = M [X(t  1)] + [W (t)]
23The eigenvalues of M relevant to the dynamic evolution of the system, for instance, can only be computed for particular
cases.
24Besides, it does not appear in the three-agent model example presented below.
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and the equilibrium relation 
X

= M

X

+

W

;
we dene the uctuations vectors :
[Y (t)] =

X(t)  X
and : h
W^ (t)
i
=

W   W  =   A(i)ii  1 P^i(t)
Finally the relation : 
X(t)  X = M X(t  1)  X+ W (t)  W 
leads to
[Y (t)] = M [Y (t  1)] +
h
W^ (t)
i
:
Assume that the system, in equilibrium at time t = 0 at Y (0) = 0, is perturbed by one single initial shock
W^ (0), i.e. W^ (t) = 0 for t > 0. In this case, one has
[Y (m)] = MmW^ (0) :
and the eigenvalues of M will determine the stability of the system.
Now that we have all the apparatus to solve explicitly any model, analytically in some cases, we will apply
it in for the three-agent model25 .
3 Application of the general model: full resolution of the three-
agent model
This section details the resolution of the three-agent model presented in Section 2.2.2. The optimization
problems are solved in the inverse order of strategic domination, respectively here for Agent B, then for
Agent C and ultimately for Agent U. Solving the model amounts to nding the matrices Mi and the vectors
Wi. We proceed with the following steps.
1. Determination of the matrices Mi
 Solve the optimization problem for Agent B The body has no information about the conscious
and the unconscious so that its expectations about their present and future actions are set to zero. And
since it ignores the inuence of the unconscious on the conscious and reciprocally, equation (11) reduces to
MB =  
h
A
(B)
B
i
= (0; 1; ; 0; 0)
 Solve the optimization problem for Agent C Recall that we have set i =  for all agents.
Thus Equation (11) for MC is
MC =  
h
A
(C)
C
i
 
X
m1
m t

(ECM)
m 1

BC



(ECM)
m+1

C
+  ((ECM)
m
)B

with h
A
(C)
C
i
= (; 0; 0; ; )
25For more complex situations and numerically dened parameters, this resolution algorithm allows nding solutions through
numerical computations.
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and
ECM =
0@ MBB MBC 0MCB MCC MCU
0 0 0
1A
Under our hypotheses, Agent C knows Agent Bs reaction to its own action, i.e. the reaction coe¢ cient
MBC. However it does not know the impact of Agent Us action on Agent B. This implies that ECMBC = 0.
Similarly Agent C is neither aware of the impact of its own action over Agent U, nor of the impact of Agent
Bs action over Agent U. The last row of blocks is therefore set to 0 in ECM . The upper-right zero reects
Agent Cs ignorance of Agent Us action over Agent B26 .
To solve Equation (11) for i = C, we postulate the following general form for ECM :
ECM =
0@ MBB MBC 0MCB MCC MCU
0 0 0
1A
=
0BBBB@
(0) (1)
 
0 0 0

(x) (y)
 
0 z u
0@ 00
0
1A 0@ 00
0
1A 0@ 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
1A
1CCCCA
=
0BBBB@
0 1 0 0 0
x y 0 z u
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCA
where the coe¢ cients x, y, z, u have to be identied. To do so, we diagonalize ECM to determine its powers.
Its eigenvalues are 0 as a triple root, and
1
2
y  1
2
p
y2 + 4x
.
All computations done, this yields for m  1
(ECM)
m
=
1p
y2 + 4x
0BBBB@
 xm 1  m 0  zm 1  um 1
 xm  m+1 0  zm  um
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCA
with:
m =

1
2
y   1
2
p
y2 + 4x
m
 

1
2
y +
1
2
p
y2 + 4x
m
Coming back to (11), we have :
MC =  
h
A
(C)
C
i
 
X
m1
m t

(ECM)
m 1

BC



(ECM)
m+1

C
+  ((ECM)
m
)B

:
The generic term of the sum over m can thus be expressed as :
26For more details see 2.3.2.
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 
X
m1
m t

(ECM)
m 1

BC



(ECM)
m+1

C
+  ((ECM)
m
)B

= 
X
m0
m
m
y2 + 4x


   xm+2  m+3 0  zm+2  um+2 
+
   xm  m+1 0  zm  um 

Moreover we have :
 
h
A
(C)
C
i
=
    0 0    
By identication, the coe¢ cients of the row MC =
 
x y 0 z u

satisfy the following equations:
x =   + 1
y2 + 4x
0@ x X
m0
m2m   x
X
m0
mm+2m
1A
y =
1
y2 + 4x
0@  X
m0
mmm+3   
X
m0
mm+1m
1A
z =
1
y2 + 4x
0@ z X
m0
m2m   z
X
m0
mm+2m
1A
u =
1
y2 + 4x
0@ u X
m0
m2m   u
X
m0
mm+2m
1A
The sums over  can be explicitly computed using the relations

y2 + 4x
X
m0
m2m = 
1  x
(x+ 1)

(1  x)2   y2

;

y2 + 4x
X
m0
mmm+1 = 
2 y
(x+ 1)

(1  x)2   y2

;

y2 + 4x
X
m0
mm+2m = 
x (1  x) + y2
(x+ 1)

(1  x)2   y2

;

y2 + 4x
X
m0
mmm+3 = y
2  x2 + 2x+ y2
(x+ 1)

(1  x)2   y2

;
and X
m1
mm 1m+2 = 
X
m0
mmm+3 = 
   a3
1  a2

+
a3 (a+ y)
3
1 + a (a+ y)
+
(a+ y)
3
1   (a+ y)2
!
:
The equations for x and y are then
x =   + x2   ( + x) (1  x)  y
2
(x+ 1)

(1  x)2   y2

y = y2
    2x   y2 + x2
(x+ 1)

(1  x)2   y2

The equation for y implies
y = 0 or 1 = 2
    2x   y2 + x2
(x+ 1)

(1  x)2   y2

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The second solution y 6= 0 implies a diverging behavior for x when  ! 0. This contradicts agentsmyopic
behavior when  ! 0. We must therefore discard this solution, and merely keep the case y = 0, which leads
directly to the following equation for x:
 x   + x32   x2 = 0:
We systematically refer to the benchmark case  = 0. An analytic solution for x is therefore useless. Rather,
we will look for a solution as a series of  and its explicit expression to the third order.
Indeed, the action of Agent U on Agent B, its consequence on Agent C and ultimately on Agent U, needs
three periods to be e¤ective. By identication :
x =   + 2 +O  4 :
The parameters z and u depending x and y can then be computed, and are given by:
z =     z
 

 + x   x   x2
(x + 1)
 
x22   2x + 1
!
and
u =   uz
 

 + x   x   x2
(x + 1)
 
x22   2x + 1
!
:
It leads to the third order to the following series expansion:
z =   +   22 + 3  2 + 22+O  4
u =    + 22   3  2 + 22+O  4
 Solve the optimization problem for Agent U MU and M can now be computed. Since agent U
is the most informed agent, EUM = M . For Agent U, Equation (11) is :8<:MU + X
m1
m
X
jU
t
 
Mm 1

jU

A
(U)
ji
 
Mm+1

U
+A
(U)
jj (M
m)j
9=; =   hA(U)U i :
which, using EUM = M , reduces to
MU + 
X
m1
m t
 
Mm 1

U
(Mm)C =  
h
A
(U)
U
i
: (17)
We seek M as a series expansion to the third order in  and proceed by a recursive computation.
Write M as the matrix
M =
0@ 0 1   0 0x 0 0 z u
MU
1A
Set the power series expansions
M =
X
m0
mMm
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and
MU =
X
m0
m (MU)m
Note that Mm is dened by
Mm =
0@  0 1   0 0x y 0 z u

m
(MU)m
1A
where 
0 1   0 0
x y 0 z u

m
denotes the matrix 
0 1   0 0
x y 0 z u

truncated at order 3 in .
As a consequence, Equation (17) leads to the recursive relation:
(MU)m+1 =  
m+1X
k=1
 
t
 
Mk 1

U
 
Mk

C

m+1 k :
Starting with (MU)0 =  
h
A
(U)
U
i
= 0, the above equation yields directly the successive terms (MU)k and
(M)k.
Ultimately, we get
M =
0BBBB@
0 1   0 0
  0 0   
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCA
+
0BBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0   
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCA
+2
0BBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
 0 0  2 2
0 0 0 0 0
0    0 0
0    0 0
1CCCCA
+3
0BBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0    2 + 22 3  2 + 22
3 0 0 2  2
0    0 0
0    0 0
1CCCCA
+O
 
4

with
 =    2 and K = 2 + 2
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The computation of the eigenvalues is straightforward. One is equal to 0, as a triple root, and, the two other
ones are complex conjugates
ip

1  1
2
2 (K + ) +
1
2
3
  22 + 2K+O  4 :
2. Determination of the vectors Wi. The vectors Wi are linear combinations of the constant vectors
X^i and the random vectors P^i(t)27 .
 Computation of the constant part X^i The computation of X^i yields the constant part of the Wi
and are given by equation (15). We have:
X^i =
X
`i
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A ((EiM)m)i`
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj

(EiM)
m 1

j`
1A9=;A(l)``  1 X^`
 
X
ji
X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj
~X
(i)
j :
For i = B, there are no agents dominated by Agent B and X^B = 0.
For i = C, since Agent C has a goal for Agent B, i.e. ~X(C)B 6= 0, replacing directly in the previous equation
yields X^C =
   2w0 .
For i = U , it is easy to check that the contribution of X^C in the previous equation is nul at the third order.
As a consequence, since Agent U has a goal ~X(U)C 6= 0 for Agent C, Equation (15) for i = U rewrites:
X^U =
X
m1
m t

(EUM)
m 1

CU
~X
(U)
C
=
X
m1
m t
 
Mm 1

CU
~X
(U)
C :
which at our order, and all calculations done, reduces to
X^U =
0@2
0@ 0 

1A+ 3
0@ 
 
1A1A ~X(U)C +O  4 :
 Computation of the random part P^i(t). Following Equation (16), the random part of P^i(t) is
given by
P^i(t) = (1  Ci) 1 Pi(t)
27See Equations (15) and (16)
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where Ci is the matrix
Ci =
8<:X
m1
0@X
ji
mi
t

Aiij

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A ((EiM)m)ii
+
X
ji
0@X
m1
mi
t

(EiM)
m 1

ji
A
(i)
jj

(EiM)
m 1

ji
1A9=;A(i)ii  1 : (19)
For i = B, no agent is dominated by Agent B and we have CB = 0 and P^B(t) = PB(t).
For i = C, one has
CC =
X
m1

m t

A
(C)
CB

(ECM)
m 1

BC

((ECM)
m
)CC
+
X
m1
mi
t

(ECM)
m 1

BC
A
(C)
BB

(ECM)
m 1

BC
:
Using A(C)CB = , A
(C)
BB =  and the expression for ECM computed previously, Equation (19) reduces to
CC = 
2 +O
 
4

and, we get
P^C(t) = (1  CC) 1 PC(t) =
 
1  2PC(t)
For i = U , EUM = M and, in the same way, Equation (19), leads to
CU =
0@X
m1
m t

(M)
m 1

CU

 
Mm 1

CU
1A
where
 =  + 
At our order, it is equal to
CU = 
2
0@ 0 0 00 2 
0  2
1A+ 3
0@ 22 0 00  22  2
0  2  22
1A+O  4 :
We nd the vectors Wi(t) by gathering the results for the X^i and Ci, and using Equation (14)
Wi(t) =  

A
(i)
ii
 1 
P^i(t) + X^i

:
Ultimately, we get :
WB(t) =  PB(t)
WC(t) =  
 
1  2PC(t)  2w0 +O  4
WU(t) =  
0@ 33   2
2  3
1A ~X(U)C   (1 + CU)PU(t) +O  3
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and
~X
(U)
C =
 ( ~w   w0) + 

1 

~f + w0


:
The matrix M and the vectors Wi being now known, they are used to determine the equilibrium.
3. Determination the equilibrium

X

The equilibrium is dened by the equation :
X

= M

X

+

W

Its solution is 
X

= (1 M) 1  W 
where

W

=
24 00
X^U
35 =
24 0X^C
X^U
35
The expansion of

W

starting with a term of order 2, we need only to compute (1 M) 1 to the rst
order:
(1 M) 1 =
0BBBB@
1
+1
1
+1   +1   1+1 (  ) 1+1 ( )
  +1 1+1  +1   1+1 (  ) 1+1 ( )
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1CCCCA+O  2
to nd the equilibrium vector to the third order:

X

= 2 ~X
(U)
C
0BBBB@
1
+1 ( )2 + 1+1 (  )2   2 +1
1
+1 ( )2 + 1+1 (  )2 + 2 
2
+1

   
 
1CCCCA+ 1 + 1
0BBBB@
1
1
0
0
0
1CCCCA ~X(C)B +O  4
= 2 ~X
(U)
C
0BBBB@
K
+1    
2+2K
+1
K
+1 + 
22 2K
+1

  (1 )
 (1 )
1CCCCA  
2w0
 + 1
0BBBB@
1
1
0
0
0
1CCCCA+O  4 :
leading directly to the values presented in section 1:
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n = 2

K   w0
 + 1
   
2 + 2K
 + 1
  ( ~w   w0) +  1   ~f + w0

w = 2

K   w0
 + 1
+ 
22   2K
 + 1
  ( ~w   w0) +  1   ~f + w0

+ w0
sn = 
3
 ( ~w   w0) + 

1 

~f + w0


sw =  2 (1 )
 ( ~w   w0) + 

1 

~f + w0


sf = 
2 (1 )
 ( ~w   w0) + 

1 

~f + w0


4 Conclusion
This paper developed a dynamic model of interactions between several interacting agents (structures) and
solved as an example the dynamic version of the three-agent model presented in [GLW]. This model allows
to study the action of a hiddenagent on the stability of a system, and the biases its presence introduces
in an equilibrium. It allows to model apparent irrational behaviors or switches in some agentsgoals and
cyclic behaviors. It can explain paradoxes such as the so-called independence of irrelevant alternativesor
sudden changes in goals when external signals, in a given situation, activate structures that will drive the
equilibrium toward an unexpected outcome.
A future, more complete treatment will allow for "unstable" structures switching on and o¤ alternately
via the intrinsic dynamics of the model.
Our results allow to ascribe inconsistent preferences and apparent switches in behaviors to the unknown
action of some strategic structures behind conscious choices. They provide a pattern for the structures
utilities and interactions. Besides, such a model is a framework in which the capacity of internal sub-
structures to plan their actions could be tested. The cyclicality of the system and the di¤erences between the
behaviors of forward and non-forward looking structures could conrm, through empirical observation, the
existence of forward-looking decisions in some unconscious processes. It should provide a better understanding
of the mechanisms at stake in mental processes.This is left for future research.
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